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IF YOU GIVE A MOUSE A COOKIE: 
CALIFORNIA’S SECTION 11135 FAILS 
TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFFS RELIEF IN 




Transportation inequity is deeply rooted in American history.1  
While the civil rights movement2 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
19643 formally outlawed racial segregation in transportation, remnants of 
inequity are still evident in modern society.4  Metropolitan transportation 
             * J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, 2013.  I would like to thank 
Professor Deborah Behles for her advice and support of my research.  I would also like to thank the 
Golden Gate University Law Review Editorial Board and Professor Ed Baskauskas for their 
contributions to this Note.  Finally, I want to express my sincere appreciation to Elizabeth Chase for 
her everlasting patience and support. 
             1 In 1896, the United States Supreme Court held that maintaining “separate but equal” 
railroad cars for African-American train passengers was constitutional.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 550-51 (1896). 
 2 E.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962) (“We have settled beyond question that 
no State may require racial segregation of interstate or intrastate transportation facilities.”). 
 3 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (Westlaw 2012). 
 4 Many transportation inequities described by Dr. Martin Luther King in 1968 have not been 
remedied by the passage of time:  
Urban transit systems in most American cities, for example, have become a genuine civil 
rights issue—and a valid one—because the layout of rapid-transit systems determines the 
accessibility of jobs to the black community. . . .  A good example of this problem is my 
home city of Atlanta, where the rapid-transit system has been laid out for the convenience of 
the white upper-middle-class suburbanites who commute to their jobs downtown. 
1
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agencies across the nation are massively subsidizing the expansion of 
inter-city rail systems that largely serve white, suburban commuters.5  
Meanwhile, these same agencies are disproportionately raising fares and 
cutting services to inner-city bus systems that serve a mostly minority 
ridership.6  These funding allocations create a disparity not only between 
inner-city riders and inter-city riders, but also between minority riders 
and white riders.7  Transportation equity is the new face of the 
environmental justice movement, grounded in the belief that “the 
benefits and burdens of transportation projects [should be] equally 
distributed among various income levels.”8 
The discriminatory patterns one might expect to find in old southern 
cities9 are evident today even in the San Francisco Bay Area, despite its 
characterization as having “liberal political attitudes” and a “culture of 
tolerance.”10  The Bay Area is somewhat unique among American cities 
in that all socio-economic groups use public transit.11  Even so, low-
income minority residents tend to depend more on public transit, 
particularly the inner-city bus system, for their daily trips than do other 
groups.12 
In Darensburg v. Metropolitan Transportation Commission, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confronted these 
issues of transportation inequity and the discriminatory effects 
attributable to the disproportionate funding practices of metropolitan 
transportation agencies.13  A class composed of members of racial 
minority groups (collectively the “plaintiffs”) alleged that the 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 325-26 (James M. Washington ed., 1991). 
 5 Kevin L. Siegel, Discrimination in the Funding of Mass Transit Systems: Formulating a 
Title VI Challenge to the Subsidization of the Alameda Contra Costa Transit District as Compared 
to the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 107 (1997). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Kevin J. Klesh, Note, Urban Sprawl: Can the “Transportation Equity” Movement and 
Federal Transportation Policy Help Break Down Barriers to Regional Solutions?, 7 ENVTL. LAW. 
649, 671 (2001) (citing Rich Stolz, Race, Poverty & Transportation, 9 POVERTY & RACE 1, 2 
(Mar./Apr. 2000), available at www.prrac.org/newsletters/marapr2000.pdf). 
 9 Orlyn O. Lockard, III, Note, Solving the “Tragedy”: Transportation, Pollution and 
Regionalism in Atlanta, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 180 n.139 (2000) (citing William Schmidt, Racial 
Roadblock Seen in Atlanta Transit System, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1987, at A16 (“The development of 
a regional transit system in the Atlanta area is being held hostage to race, and I think it’s high time 
we admitted it and talked about it.” (quoting J. David Chestnut, then-chairman of the Metropolitan 
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority))). 
 10 Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 524 (9th Cir. 2011) (Noonan, J., 
concurring). 
 11 Siegel, supra note 5, at 114. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 514. 
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Metropolitan Transportation Commission’s (MTC’s) practice of 
persistently underfunding the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit (AC 
Transit) inner-city bus system, while heavily investing in the Bay Area 
Rapid Transit (BART) inter-city rail system, amounted to intentional 
discrimination and had a disparate impact on low-income persons of 
color.14  The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional and 
statutory claims, holding that MTC’s funding decisions did not 
intentionally discriminate against, nor have a disparate impact on the 
minority class.15  In a concurring opinion, one judge went even further, 
decrying the fact that the lawsuit was brought in the first place.16 
While courts continually narrow the reach of disparate-impact 
litigation under federal law,17 the California Legislature has expanded 
the scope of its state antidiscrimination laws.18  California has given 
plaintiffs challenging institutional disparities a proverbial “cookie” by 
providing a private right of action for disparate-impact discrimination, 
but, ultimately, plaintiffs are denied their glass of milk by the 
overwhelming evidentiary burdens required to substantiate these claims.  
The burden-of-proof issues faced by plaintiffs in Darensburg illustrate 
the uphill road ahead for future litigants challenging institutional 
disparities still present in today’s “culture of tolerance.”19 
This Note examines Darensburg and the evidentiary problems faced 
by plaintiffs entangled in the bus-versus-rail controversy that are inherent 
to disparate-impact litigation.  Part I discusses the factual background of 
Darensburg and relevant federal and state law concerning claims of both 
intentional and disparate-impact discrimination.  Part II examines 
disparate-impact jurisprudence in the context of the unequal distribution 
of municipal services as background to the complexity of the issues 
presented in Darensburg.  Part III analyzes the Darensburg opinion in 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 514-15. 
 16 Id. at 524 (Noonan, J., concurring) (“The notion of a Bay Area board bent on racist goals 
is a specter that only desperate litigation could entertain.”). 
 17 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (“[I]t is . . . beyond dispute—and no 
party disagrees—that § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination.”); Save Our Valley v. Sound 
Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing that section 601 does not create a right “to be 
free from racially discriminating effects”). 
 18 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (Westlaw 2012) (prohibiting intentional 
discrimination); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 98101(i)(1) (Westlaw 2012) (prohibiting disparate-
impact discrimination); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139 (Westlaw 2012) (providing a private right of 
action to bring claims of disparate-impact discrimination). 
 19 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 523-24 (Noonan, J., concurring) (“The twentieth century racial 
categories so confidently deployed no longer correspond to American life among the young.  What is 
true of the young is already characteristic of the Bay Area where social change has been fostered by 
liberal political attitudes, and a culture of tolerance.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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light of that background and shows that the burden-of-proof issues faced 
by plaintiffs are illustrative of the lack of effective guidance to plaintiffs 
seeking relief from institutional disparities. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. FACTS AND HISTORY OF DARENSBURG V. MTC 
The named plaintiff, Sylvia Darensburg, a low-income African-
American resident of East Oakland, relied on AC Transit bus service to 
meet the transportation needs of herself and her family.20  Increases in 
transit fares since 2001 stretched her budget so tightly that she could not 
pay other bills on time.21  Because of the unreliable service AC Transit 
provided, she was unable to accept or retain employment.22  Cuts in 
service required that she take two or three buses to reach her 
destinations.23  And due to the discontinuation of a service line near her 
home, she had to walk long distances in bad neighborhoods at night on 
her return home from college classes.24  Darensburg represented a class 
of minority patrons of AC Transit, all with similar stories.25  Due to 
funding shortfalls, AC Transit had been forced to cut urban bus service, 
to the plaintiffs’ detriment.26  Meanwhile, MTC’s long-term financial 
plan for the allocation of federal and state subsidies for transportation 
dedicated ninety-four percent of its $10.5 billion budget to new rail 
projects, leaving only five percent to fund new bus projects.27 
The plaintiff class filed suit in federal court, alleging that defendant 
MTC’s funding practices, though facially race-neutral, actually diverted 
funding from AC Transit bus service to costly BART rail expansion 
projects, resulting in disproportionate harm to AC Transit’s minority bus 
ridership.28  The plaintiffs’ first claim was based on Equal Protection.29  
 20 Second Amended Complaint at 6, Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 
994 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C-05-01597 EDL), aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *8. 
 21 Darensburg, v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2009), 
aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Second Amended Complaint at 6, Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (No. C-05-01597 
EDL), aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *9. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1001. 
 26 Id. at 1038. 
 27 Appellants’ Opening Brief at 19, Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511 
(9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-15878), 2009 WL 6866035, at *11. 
 28 Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 997. 
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They alleged that MTC’s disparate funding allocations violated their 
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because they had the purpose and effect of 
discriminating against transit riders on the bases of race and national 
origin.30 
The plaintiffs’ second claim alleged a violation of Title VI.31  They 
claimed that because MTC was a recipient of federal funds, and because 
the allocations of those funds had the purpose and effect of 
discriminating against transit riders on the bases of race and national 
origin, MTC was acting in violation of section 601 of Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.32 
The plaintiffs’ third claim was based on California Government 
Code section 11135.33  Like Title VI, section 11135 prohibits intentional 
discrimination, but it goes further to prohibit disparate-impact 
discrimination in state-funded programs and activities.34  The plaintiffs 
claimed that MTC’s funding allocations created a disparate impact 
against transit riders on the bases of race, national origin, and ethnic 
group identification, effectively denying the plaintiffs full and equal 
access to public transportation.35 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
granted in part and denied in part MTC’s motions for summary 
judgment, holding that there were triable issues of fact as to disparate-
impact discrimination under California statutory law, but finding 
insufficient evidence as to intentional discrimination under federal or 
state law.36  At trial, the district court found that the plaintiffs had 
established a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination because 
MTC’s process for prioritizing transportation funding in its long-range 
plan caused “a disparity in funding for rail projects that on the whole are 
 29 Second Amended Complaint at 28-29, Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (No. C-05-01597 
EDL), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *55-56. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Second Amended Complaint at 29, Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (No. C-05-01597 
EDL), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *56-57. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Second Amended Complaint at 29-30, Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (No. C-05-01597 
EDL), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *57-58. 
 34 Danfeng Soto-Vigil Koon, Cal. Gov’t Code § 11135: A Challenge to Contemporary State-
Funded Discrimination, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 239, 241-42 (2011). 
 35 Second Amended Complaint at 29-30, Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (No. C-05-01597 
EDL), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *57-58. 
 36 Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 998. 
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used by a lower percentage of minority riders, as opposed to bus 
projects.”37 
A prima facie case under section 11135 requires that a plaintiff 
establish the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral practices that are 
related to a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on 
minorities.38  Unlike intentional discrimination claims, proving 
disparate-impact discrimination does not require a showing of 
discriminatory intent.39  Plaintiffs may prevail by offering “statistical 
evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in 
question has caused the exclusion of [plaintiffs] because of their 
membership in a protected group.”40  Thus, the plaintiffs here bore the 
initial burden of showing a disparate impact using some appropriate 
measure that could adequately capture how they were treated differently 
as members of a protected group.41  The district court found that the 
plaintiffs’ ridership statistics combined with the fact that MTC applied 
wholly different funding criteria to bus projects than to rail projects42 
satisfied this burden by showing increased and disparate funding for rail 
projects that, on the whole, are used by a lower percentage of minority 
riders as compa 43
Once the plaintiffs met their burden to establish a prima facie case 
regarding MTC’s long-range plan, the burden shifted to MTC to justify 
its practices.44  However, the appropriate standard for MTC’s rebuttal 
burden was a point of contention between the parties.45  The plaintiffs 
argued for the “business necessity” rebuttal standard46 originally 
 37 Id. at 1044.  However, the court held that MTC’s apportionment of committed and 
uncommitted funds did not constitute disparate-impact discrimination.  Id. at 1051. 
 38 Id. at 1042 (citing Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 39 Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Gamble, 104 F.3d at 
306). 
 40 Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988)). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 1043. 
 43 Id. at 1044. 
 44 Id. at 1051.  The state burden-shifting framework for analyzing disparate-impact claims is 
analogous to the framework under Title VI (imported from Title VII): (1) a plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case if the defendant’s facially neutral practice causes a disproportionate adverse impact 
on a protected class; (2) to rebut, the defendant must justify the challenged practice; and (3) if the 
defendant meets its rebuttal burden, the plaintiff may still prevail by establishing a less 
discriminatory alternative.  Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 45 Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
 46 Id. at 1051-52 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)). 
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incorporated by reference into section 11135’s final regulations.47  This 
standard requires a defendant to prove that the challenged practice is 
“necessary for safe and efficient operation of the business,” is related to 
the stated business purpose, and cannot be replaced by an equally 
effective but less discriminatory alternative.48  This standard 
demonstrates the California Legislature’s intent to provide broad 
protections against discrimination.49 
Nevertheless, the district court rejected the business-necessity 
standard and instead required that MTC justify its conduct only by a 
“preponderance of competent, relevant evidence, which need not consist 
of rigorous statistical studies as long as it is persuasive.”50  The court 
distinguished the cases relied on by the plaintiffs for the business-
necessity standard because they were employment discrimination cases 
brought under Title VII concerning a “discrete practice,” which did not 
readily translate to the facts in Darensburg because MTC’s practice 
involved complex and multi-faceted decisions regarding differently 
situated service operators.51  The court reasoned that the more relaxed 
“substantial legitimate justification”52 standard was appropriate because 
MTC was responsible for making policy and budgetary decisions within 
a complex web of statutory, regulatory, and administrative constraints.53  
The court concluded that MTC met this burden by showing that its 
funding decisions were based on existing funding constraints and the 
legitimate goal of improving interconnectivity and convenience for all 
transit riders.54 
 47 Section 11135’s regulations incorporate by reference the definitions and prohibitions 
contained in California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act’s (FEHA’s) implementing regulations.  
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 98400 (Westlaw 2012).  See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 26, Darensburg, 
636 F.3d 511 (No. 09-15878), 2010 WL 3708467, at *19. 
 48 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 98400; see also id. tit. 2, § 7286.7(b) (“Business Necessity.  
Where an employer or other covered entity has a facially neutral practice which has an adverse 
impact (i.e., is discriminatory in effect), the employer or other covered entity must prove that there 
exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and 
efficient operation of the business and that the challenged practice effectively fulfills the business 
purpose it is supposed to serve.  The practice may still be impermissible where it is shown that there 
exists an alternative practice which would accomplish the business purpose equally well with a 
lesser discriminatory impact.”). 
 49 See, e.g., id. tit. 22, § 98400 (incorporating FEHA regulations which require a business 
necessity to overcome adverse impact).  
 50 Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
 51 Id. at 1053.  But see id. at 1040 (“[A] successful disparate impact claim must identify a 
discrete practice.”). 
 52 The court imported the substantial legitimate justification standard from a transportation 
case in the Second Circuit.  Id. at 1053 (adopting the standard employed by the Second Circuit in 
N.Y. Urban League v. N.Y., 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). 
 53 Id. at 1054. 
 54 Id. at 1057-58. 
7
Baldridge: Darensburg v. Metropolitan Transportation Commission
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
14 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
 
The burden then shifted back to the plaintiffs to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that an equally effective, yet less 
discriminatory, alternative existed.55  The court held that while the 
plaintiffs’ proffered alternatives held merit, they failed to meet their 
burden of showing those alternatives to be equally effective while 
causing less of a discriminatory impact.56  Consequently, the plaintiffs’ 
prayer for relief against MTC was denied.57 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the lower 
court erred in applying the “substantial legitimate justification” standard 
and that the complex and competing goals used to satisfy the standard 
did not justify the court’s departure from the prevailing business-
necessity standard.58  Rather than addressing the appropriate rebuttal 
standard, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment on entirely different 
grounds.59  It held that the statistical measure of disparity the plaintiffs 
used was unsound, and it went even further by remarking that the 
plaintiffs’ claim rested upon a “logical fallacy.”60  The court of appeals 
found that the district court’s finding of a prima facie case of disparate-
impact discrimination was “clearly erroneous,” reasoning that the 
plaintiffs’ general population statistics, offered to demonstrate the 
disparity between minority bus riders and rail riders, failed to establish 
that MTC’s funding practices favoring rail projects actually 
disadvantaged minorities.61 
While conceding that the statistical evidence proffered by the 
plaintiffs showed that minorities make up a greater percentage of bus 
riders than rail riders, the court did not agree that it necessarily followed 
that a rail expansion plan that took money from AC Transit would harm 
its minority ridership.62  The court faulted the plaintiffs’ theory because, 
it reasoned, the plaintiffs had not considered that a rail expansion plan 
could, in the alternative, actually help minority transit users.63  Without a 
precise measure of how future rail projects would eventually serve the 
Bay Area’s transit ridership, the court declined to come to a conclusion 
on whether rail-centered funding allocations would help or harm the 
 55 Id. at 1060-61. 
 56 Id. at 1061. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Appellants Opening Brief at 10, Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 09-15878), 2009 WL 6866035, at *2. 
 59 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 514-15. 
 60 Id. at 514. 
 61 Id. at 522. 
 62 Id. at 514-15. 
 63 Id. at 515. 
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minority ridership.64  Because the court found error in the district court’s 
finding of a prima facie case of disparate impact, it did not address the 
burden-shifting framework used by the district court.65 
B. RELEVANT LAW 
Because no legislation addresses transportation inequities 
specifically, plaintiffs may use a variety of legal theories to fit their 
case.66  As was the case in Darensburg, those seeking redress for the 
disproportionate distribution of municipal services often base their 
claims on civil rights statutes grounded in Equal Protection.67  In 
addition, because metropolitan transportation agencies like MTC are the 
recipients of both federal and state funding, plaintiffs may pursue Title 
VI claims under federal law and equivalent claims under state law.68 
1. Federal Law 
a. Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides the primary constitutional cause of action available to remedy 
inequities.69  The constitutional prohibition on disparate treatment in this 
context prevents government actors from allocating environmental 
benefits and burdens on racial grounds.70  To prove a violation, plaintiffs 
must show that persons who are similarly situated are being treated 
differently (i.e., a disparate impact) and must also provide evidence of 
intent to effectuate the discriminatory practice.71  In the absence of direct 
proof of intentional discrimination by government actors, courts have 
been reluctant to infer intentional discrimination solely from evidence of 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See generally Sten-Erik Hoidal, Note, Returning to the Roots of Environmental Justice: 
Lessons from the Inequitable Distribution of Municipal Services, 88 MINN. L. REV. 193 (2003) 
(describing the various legal tools available to environmental justice plaintiffs, including 
environmental statutes, common-law property claims, constitutional challenges, and civil rights 
laws). 
 67 Id. at 195. 
 68 Koon, supra note 34, at 241-42. 
 69 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no state shall “deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). 
 70 Hoidal, supra note 66, at 204. 
 71 See, e.g., Terry Props., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(finding no discriminatory intent in the siting of an industrial plant in a largely African-American 
community). 
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racially disparate impact.72  The difficulty of meeting the intentional 
discrimination burden has severely hampered plaintiffs pursuing this 
remedy.73 
b. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Rooted in Congress’s taxing and spending powers, Title VI 
prohibits discrimination by recipients of federal funding.74  In the context 
of the disproportionate allocation of municipal services, sections 60175 
and 60276 provide the relevant authority.  Section 601 provides that “[n]o 
person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”77  Section 602 authorizes federal 
agencies to create regulations to effectuate the goals of section 601 and 
provides the means of enforcement.78  For example, the Federal Transit 
Administration’s (FTA’s) guidelines for carrying out the U.S. 
Department of Transportation’s Title VI implementing regulations79 
provide that recipients of federal funds should “[e]nsure that the level 
and quality of public transportation service is provided in a 
nondiscriminatory manner” and “[p]romote full and fair participation in 
public transportation decision-making without regard to race, color, or 
national origin.”80 
 72 See Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that 
plaintiffs failed to prove discriminatory intent, despite showing disparate impact of hazardous waste 
facility siting); E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb Cnty. Planning & Zoning 
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 886 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs failed to provide evidence 
to support a determination that race was a motivating factor, despite strong evidence of disparate 
impact); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that plaintiffs 
lacked the evidence necessary to show discriminatory intent, despite the existence of a disparate 
impact on minorities). 
 73 Hoidal, supra note 66, at 204. 
 74 Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (stating that Title 
VI was enacted under Congress’s power to spend for the general welfare of the United States). 
 75 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (Westlaw 2012) (prohibiting intentional discrimination caused by 
disparate treatment). 
 76 Id. § 2000d-1 (prohibiting discrimination resulting from policies and actions that have a 
disparate impact on protected groups). 
 77 Id. § 2000d. 
 78 Id. § 2000d-1. 
 79 Nondiscrimination in Federally-Assisted Programs of the DOT—Effectuation of Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 C.F.R. pt. 21 (Westlaw 2012). 
 80 FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FTA C 4702.1B, TITLE VI REQUIREMENTS 
AND GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION RECIPIENTS II-1 (2012), available at 
www.fta.dot.gov/documents/FTA_Title_VI_FINAL.pdf. 
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A successful claim under section 601 requires proof of 
discriminatory intent.81  Consequently, as with Equal Protection claims, 
the majority of environmental justice claims alleging intentional 
discrimination to date have failed.82 
Conversely, section 602 requires only a showing of disparate-
impact discrimination.83  However, there is no explicit private right of 
action for plaintiffs to file suit under section 602.84  Agency regulations 
promulgated under section 602 may go further than the statute they 
implement by “proscribing activities that have disparate effects on racial 
groups, even though such activities are permissible under section 601,”85 
thus creating “considerable tension” between section 601 and disparate-
impact regulations.86   
While the Supreme Court had numerous opportunities to address the 
scope of Title VI’s reach, it did not decide until 2001 whether there 
existed a private right of action to enforce agency disparate-impact 
regulations promulgated under section 602.87  In Alexander v. 
Sandoval,88 the Court answered the question in the negative and held that 
there is no private right of action to enforce agency regulations,89 
 81 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (“[I]t is . . . beyond dispute—and no 
party disagrees—that § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination.”); Save Our Valley v. Sound 
Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing that section 601 does not create a right “to be 
free from racially discriminating effects”). 
 82 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 72. 
 83 See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (upholding 
administrative regulations implementing Title VI, which prohibit disparate-impact discrimination). 
 84 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-1 (Westlaw 2012); see also Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-89; Save Our 
Valley, 335 F.3d at 944 (“The disparate-impact regulation cannot create a new right; it can only 
“effectuate” a right already created by § 601.  And § 601 does not create the right that [plaintiff] 
seeks to enforce, the right to be free from racially discriminatory effects.”). 
 85 Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 935 n.2. 
 86 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282. 
 87 See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582; Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); Cannon v. Univ. 
of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 88 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 275. 
 89 Id. at 285-89 (“It is clear now that the disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply § 
601-since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits-and therefore clear that the private right of 
action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regulations.”)  At least one 
commentator has cogently argued that Sandoval was wrongly decided: 
The Court’s implicit reasoning, based upon Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 
is unpersuasive because, contrary to Sandoval’s assertion, Bakke never held that there existed 
clear congressional intent to limit the scope of Title VI to intentional discrimination.  
Conversely, the Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission-Alexander v. Choate 
line of cases is incapable of standing for the proposition that disparate-impact regulations are 
valid law.  Rather, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council provides the only 
appropriate means of determining the validity of disparate-impact regulations.  After working 
through a Chevron analysis, it is apparent that the 88th Congress never expressed a clear and 
unambiguous intent as to the scope of Title VI’s anti-discrimination mandate.  Because the 
11
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effectively requiring Title VI plaintiffs to prove intentional 
discrimination under section 601, or to seek redress under other laws.  
Justice Stevens, dissenting, pointed to earlier case law90 to show that 
Sandoval was a sharp departure from precedent and that “[l]itigants who 
in the future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors 
in all likelihood must only reference [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 to obtain 
relief.”91 
c. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
In the wake of Sandoval, many environmental justice plaintiffs were 
successful in bringing section 602 disparate-impact claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 as Justice Stevens had suggested.92  Section 1983 “allows 
suits for violations of the Constitution and other federal laws against 
persons acting under color of law.”93  Because a violation of section 602 
is a breach of federal law, it would follow that such a violation should be 
actionable under § 1983.94  Plaintiffs tried to use this logic to seek 
redress under section 602, but the success of this approach was short-
lived. 
In South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection, the Third Circuit held that “Title VI does not 
88th Congress did not precisely address whether “discrimination” embodied an intent or 
effects standard, under the holding of the Court’s opinion in Chevron U.S.A., the judiciary 
must defer to EPA’s permissibly constructed disparate-impact regulations[, which] therefore 
remain[ ] valid federal law after Sandoval. 
David J. Galalis, Note, Environmental Justice and Title VI in the Wake of Alexander v. Sandoval: 
Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61, 101 
(2004).  Judge Berzon of the Ninth Circuit also noted that Chevron deference to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes could help courts interpret the scope of statutory rights under § 
1983, but she ultimately concluded that section 602 regulations did not establish an enforceable right 
under § 1983 because of the Supreme Court’s clear direction in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 
273, 283 (2002), that only an explicit private right of action would support a cause of action under § 
1983 in Spending Clause cases such as Title VI.  Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 958-65 (Berzon, J., 
dissenting in part). 
 90 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 598-
99). 
 91 Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 92 See Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 To Enforce Title VI’s Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 321 (2001); see also Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(indicating that disparate-impact claims may still be brought under § 1983); Langlois v. Abington 
Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 52-55 (D. Mass. 2002) (permitting a disparate-impact suit pursuant 
to § 1983); White v. Engler, 188 F. Supp. 2d 730, 743-45 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (permitting claims 
under § 1983 regarding the disbursement of education funds). 
 93 CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN, EILEEN GAUNA & CATHERINE A. O’NEILL, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION 509 (2d ed. 2009); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 
2012). 
 94 RECHTSCHAFFEN, GAUNA & O’NEILL, supra note 93, at 493. 
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establish a right to be free of disparate impact discrimination,” and to 
hold that agency regulations promulgated under section 602 could 
“constitute a ‘federal right’ enforceable under [§] 1983” would “give the 
statute a scope beyond that [which] Congress contemplated.”95  The 
Supreme Court soon agreed and put an end to the use of § 1983 as a tool 
to entertain section 602 disparate-impact claims.96 
2.  State Law: California Government Code Section 11135 
The California Legislature has provided the means to allow 
plaintiffs redress for discrimination under California Government Code 
section 11135 and its implementing regulations.97  This section is 
analogous to Title VI in that it prohibits intentional discrimination98 and 
disparate-impact discrimination99 in state-funded programs and 
activities.  California law is distinguishable from Title VI, however, in 
that it explicitly provides a private right of action to enforce section 
11135 and its regu 100
II. DISPARATE-IMPACT JURISPRUDENCE: PLAINTIFFS’ BURDEN OF 
PROOF 
After Sandoval, plaintiffs must be able to state a claim of intentional 
discrimination to bring a cause of action under Title VI.101  If plaintiffs 
cannot proffer evidence supporting that claim, or if the gravamen of the 
 95 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790-91 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
 96 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286-87 (2002). 
 97 California Government Code section 11135 provides:  
No person in the State of California shall, on the basis of race, national origin, ethnic group 
identification, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, color, genetic information, or disability, 
be unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of, or be unlawfully subjected to 
discrimination under, any program or activity that is conducted, operated, or administered by 
the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any financial 
assistance from the state. 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
 98 Id. § 11135. 
 99 Section 11135’s regulations prohibit practices that “utilize criteria or methods of 
administration that have the purpose or effect of subjecting a person to discrimination.”  CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 22, § 98101(i)(1) (Westlaw 2012). 
 100 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139 (Westlaw 2012) (“This article and regulations adopted 
pursuant to this article may be enforced by a civil action for equitable relief, which shall be 
independent of any other rights and remedies.”); Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Servs. of L.A., 24 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 474, 480 (Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing the private right of action created by the 
Legislature). 
 101 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001). 
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complaint lies in a disparate impact resulting from government action 
rather than an identifiable practice of discrimination, the claim will 
fail.102  The critical distinction in a plaintiff’s potential relief from 
discriminatory effects is therefore contingent on the standard of proof 
required to establish a prima facie case of either type of claim.  The 
California Legislature has provided a private right of action for claims 
based solely on disparate impact under California law.103  However, a 
survey of disparate-impact jurisprudence reveals that even California’s 
broadened protections may not effectively remedy the overarching 
judicial reticence toward disparate-impact litigation.104 
Further, using the disparate-impact analysis outside of the 
intentional discrimination framework “transform[s] essentially political 
questions about economic allocation . . . into courtroom battles that 
obscure, rather than illuminate, the choices that must be made.”105  The 
allocation of billions of dollars of state and federal funding requires the 
institutional decisionmaker to navigate “the messy mass of facts, factors, 
and guesses going into planning for regional transportation”106—a task 
perhaps better-suited to the political arena than the courtroom.  This 
point is well-illustrated in Darensburg.107 
A. THE ROOTS OF THE DISPARATE-IMPACT ANALYSIS 
The disparate-impact analysis was first adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, an employment discrimination 
case brought under Title VII.108  Prior to the passage of Title VII, Duke 
Power explicitly restricted African-American employees to low-level, 
 102 See id. 
 103 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139 (providing a private right of action to enforce the 
disparate-impact regulations of California Government Code § 11135). 
 104 See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.C.1-2. 
 105 Todd B. Adams, Environmental Justice and the Limits of Disparate Impact Analysis, 16 
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 417, 418 (1999); see also Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 
511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011) (Noonan, J., concurring) (“The American instinct to cast controversies into 
a legal forum has been an American characteristic at least since Alexis de Tocqueville observed in 
1835, ‘Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, 
into a judicial question.’” (citing 1 TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley 
ed., Henry Reeve trans., rev. by Francis Bowen ed., 1945) (1898))). 
 106 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 524 (Noonan, J., concurring). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  However, Title VII did not explicitly 
mention disparate-impact analysis until 1991.  See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 
105, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2(k) (Westlaw 2012).  The Act essentially codified Griggs in response to the Court’s subsequent 
lowering of that standard.  See id.; Ward’s Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 
(1989). 
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low-paying jobs.109  Following the passage of Title VII, Duke Power 
traded its explicitly discriminatory policies for facially neutral testing 
requirements that, according to plaintiffs, continued to effectively deny 
African-American employees jobs for which they were qualified, 
perpetuating racial segregation within the company.110  The district and 
appellate courts, however, found the policies valid under Title VII 
because “there was no showing of racial purpose or invidious intent.”111 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[d]iscriminatory 
preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only 
what Congress has proscribed.  What is required by Congress is the 
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment 
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of 
racial or other impermissible classification.”112  Therefore, the Court held 
that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices 
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation,” or, in other words, 
practices that result in a disparate impact.113 
The Supreme Court later described the operation of the disparate-
impact analysis as “functionally equivalent to intentional 
discrimination”114—“[t]he distinguishing features of the factual issues 
that typically dominate in disparate impact cases do not imply that the 
ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where . . . [the intentional 
discrimination] analysis is used.”115  However, this approach raises the 
question of “whether disparate impact analysis should apply where 
statistical studies show a disparate impact on minorities but the statistical 
studies do not, for various reasons, give rise to an inference of intentional 
discrimination.”116  This question is especially important after Sandoval, 
where the distinction between evidence of intentional discrimination and 
disparate impact discrimination will determine whether a plaintiff’s 
 109 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426-27. 
 110 Id. at 427, 431-32. 
 111 Id. at 429. 
 112 Id. at 431. 
 113 Id.  After establishing that the policies had a disparate impact, the court moved on to the 
second prong of the analysis, under which an employer has “the burden of showing that any given 
requirement [resulting in a disparate impact] must have a manifest relationship to the employment in 
question.”  Id. at 432.  Because Duke Power could not meet this burden, the Court never reached the 
third prong of the disparate-impact analysis.  The Court later articulated the third prong in Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, providing that if the defendant proved a business necessity for the challenged 
practice, the plaintiff could still prevail by showing that a less discriminatory alternative existed.  
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). 
 114 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988). 
 115 Id.  It is important to note that Watson was decided prior to Sandoval.  In the post-
Sandoval world, this distinction is critical in determining whether plaintiffs will get their day in 
court. 
 116 Adams, supra note 105, at 426. 
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claims are litigable under Title VI.  Yet, prior to Sandoval—and even in 
California where section 11135 provides a private right of action for 
disparate-impact discrimination—the lack of clarity between the two 
standards serves to inhibit a plaintiff’s success under either theory.117 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
Titles VI and VII contain similar distinctions between intent and 
impact in the context of prohibiting discrimination.  Similarity also lies 
in the fact that circumstantial evidence of impact may prove intent.118  
Because case law is far more developed under Title VII, courts often 
look to that analytical model when construing Title VI.119  Similarly, 
“[i]n light of the parallel language of state and federal 
[antidiscrimination] law[s],” the federal framework also guides 
California disparate-impact analyses.120  Therefore, as under Title VI, a 
prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination under section 11135 
requires “(1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral practices, and 
(2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a 
particular type produced by the defendant’s facially neutral acts or 
practices.”121   
In a case in which a facially neutral practice is challenged, the 
plaintiffs’ burden is to identify specific “practices that are allegedly 
responsible for any observed statistical disparities.”122  Plaintiffs must 
then establish causation by presenting “statistical evidence of a kind and 
degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the 
exclusion of [plaintiffs] because of their membership in a protected 
group.”123  This “formulation” has “never been framed in terms of any 
rigid mathematical formula,” but the Supreme Court has “consistently 
stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that 
 117 See, e.g., Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“Plaintiffs’ failure to establish . . . discriminatory impact prevents any inference of intentional 
discrimination.”). 
 118 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 119 See, e.g., Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
 120 E.g., City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 236 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721-23 
(1987) (using Title VII standards to analyze a claim under California’s Fair Employment and 
Housing Act). 
 121 Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 1996) (using Title 
VII standards to analyze a claim under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act). 
 122 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). 
 123 Id. at 994-95. 
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underlying model.”   This disagreement is evident in Supreme Court 
precedent131 and in the legislative history and text of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991.132 
they raise such an inference of causation.”124  Plaintiffs’ statistical 
evidence must also reflect an “‘appropriate measure’ for assessing 
disparate impact,”125 as “[c]ourts [and] defendants [are not] obliged to 
assume that plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is reliable.”126  However, the 
meaning of the terms “sufficiently substantial” and “appropriate 
measure” are subject to disagreement, as courts have not clearly defined 
either. 
One commentator has suggested that societal change since Griggs 
may explain why clear standards in this area are lacking.127  For 
example, “[i]n 1979, the Supreme Court was close to taking judicial 
notice that racial discrimination had excluded African-Americans from 
jobs in crafts throughout the country.”128  Yet “[t]oday, many Supreme 
Court Justices may view society as less pervasively racist, as well as be 
more skeptical of statistics.”129  Thus, “[a] fundamental disagreement 
over the role of disparate impact analysis . . . with respect to societal 
discrimination probably hindered the articulation of a consistent 
130
 
 124 Id. at 995 (emphasis added) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 
(1975) (hiring practices that “select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly 
different from that of the pool of applicants”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-47 (1976) 
(hiring “practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks”); Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (hiring practices that “select applicants for hire in a 
significantly discriminatory pattern”); N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979) 
(“statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying the members of 
3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting N.Y.C. 
nvtl. 214 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing N.Y. Urban League v. 
.Y., 
plains the 
of tolerance.  An individual bigot may be found, perhaps even a pocket of racists.  The 
st goals is a specter that only desperate litigation could 
entertain.”). 
 130 Adams, supra note 105, at 432. 
 131 Id. (citing McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973); United 
Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 218 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 348-50 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Johnson, 480 U.S. 
one race equal access to employment opportunities”); Conn. v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) 
(“significantly discriminatory impact”)). 
 125 Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.
E  Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 
N 71 F.3d 1031, 1038 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam))). 
 126 Watson, 487 U.S. at 996. 
 127 Adams, supra note 105, at 432.  The author argued that “viewing disparate impact analysis 
as a sophisticated from of ‘pretext analysis’ better harmonizes the evolving law and ex
judicial reluctance to extend the doctrine into certain areas.”  Id. at 418 (internal citations omitted). 
 128 Id. at 432 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 n.1 (1979)). 
 129 Id. (citing Johnson v. Santa Clara Cnty. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 664-66 (1987)); cf. 
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 523-24 (Noonan, J., concurring) (“What is true of the young is already 
characteristic of the Bay Area where social change has been fostered by liberal political attitudes, 
and a culture 
notion of a Bay Area board bent on raci
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ay serve as 
a gui
RATING THE 
BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
Pre-Sandoval cases involving disparate-impact claims brought by 
aggrieved plaintiffs claiming unequal distribution of funds between bus 
and rail illustrate the evidentiary burdens faced by plaintiffs challenging 
institutional disparities in this context and provide background for the 
court’s analysis in Darensburg.  The first two cases involved claims that 
In the absence of any “rigid mathematical formula”133 or 
articulation of a model disparate-impact analysis, case law m
de in proving disparate-impact discrimination.134  However, the lack 
of significant case law outside of the employment context leads to varied 
results,135 and this variation often hinders plaintiffs’ claims of 
institutional disparate-impact discrimination.136  Absent clear evidentiary 
standards, the evidentiary burden plaintiffs face in proving a prima facie 
case of disparate-impact discrimination may serve only as an 
“evidentiary dragnet” designed to “smoke[] out” instances of hidden—
but deliberate—intentional discrimination rather than to “dismantle racial 
hierarchies” alleged in cases such as Darensburg.137 
C. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN PRACTICE: ILLUST
 
at 659-60 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 
(2011). 
 132 Adams, supra note 105, at 432 (citing Symposium, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Unraveling the Controversy, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 887 (1993)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k) (Westlaw 2012). 
 133 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 (1988). 
 134 However, a survey in this area of law may leave one wondering if the appropriate standard 
is that articulated by Justice Stewart in defining “hard-core pornography”: “I know it when I see it.”  
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 135 The standards articulated under Title VII do not easily translate to analyses outside of the 
employment discrimination context.  For example, a prima facie case of discrimination under Title 
VII requires the plaintiff to establish (1) his or her membership in a protected class, (2) his or her 
qualification for the position, (3) an adverse employment action, and (4) circumstances giving rise to 
an inference of discrimination on the basis of membership in the protected class.  McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 136 For example, although the Supreme Court has never ruled on whether Title VIII includes a 
disparate-impact standard, the circuits have agreed that it does apply in the housing context.  See 
John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act and Insurance: An Update and the Question of Disability 
Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 174 (2002) (“[V]irtually every jurisdiction has held that 
the ‘disparate impact’ discrimination analysis is appropriate in FHA cases.”).  However, the circuits 
disagree on whether Title VI’s burden-shifting framework or the balancing test utilized in early Title 
VIII cases is appropriate.  Compare Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147-48 (3d Cir. 
1977) (utilizing Title VI’s burden-shifting framework), with NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 
F.2d 926, 940 (2d Cir. 1988) (utilizing a balancing test). 
 137 See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 493, 520-21 (2003) (describing competing constructions of disparate-impact discrimination). 
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parate 
e third 
case involved a claim alleging both discriminatory intent and impact.139  
Alth
the distribution of federal subsidies and fare structures had a dis
impact on racial minorities in low-income neighborhoods.138  Th
ough this third case was resolved through settlement, the resulting 
consent decree withstood appeals both before and after Sandoval, and the 
case is therefore “the best example that Title VI, . . . though wounded, 
[is] not dead.”140  However, a case arising post-Sandoval involving both 
discriminatory intent and impact, including a section 11135 claim, shows 
that while Sandoval may have foreclosed disparate-impact claims under 
Title VI, the analysis under section 11135 remains the same—only the 
forum has changed to litigate these claims.141 
1. Pre-Sandoval Bus-Versus-Rail Disparate-Impact Cases  
In New York Urban League v. New York, plaintiffs challenged the 
State of New York’s and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s 
(MTA’s) allocation of funds for mass transit.142  Plaintiffs alleged that 
riders of the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) subway and 
bus systems, “the majority of whom are members of protected minority 
groups, pay a higher share of the cost of operating the system than 
he U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s 
gran
commuter line passengers who are predominantly white.”143  T
t of a preliminary injunction barring the implementation of a twenty 
percent fare increase for riders of the NYCTA subway and bus 
systems.144  The district court had concluded that the “plaintiffs had 
 
 138 N.Y. Urban League v. N.Y., 71 F.3d 1031, 1033 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (finding 
favoritism for suburbanite users of rail a rational exercise of transit system’s business judgment); 
omm
, 1996), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 Bullard et al. eds., 2004).  
owe
, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2007), vacated in part, 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 
009)
 Id. 
C . for a Better N. Phila. v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., No. 88-1275, 1990 WL 121177, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 14, 1990), aff’d mem., 935 F.2d 1280 (3d Cir. 1991) (recognizing such disparities but not 
finding them actionable). 
 139 Labor/Cmty. Strategy Center v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. CV-94-05936 TJH 
(CMX) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29
 140 Eric Mann, Los Angeles Bus Riders Derail the MTA, in HIGHWAY ROBBERY: 
TRANSPORTATION RACISM & NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY 33, 33 (Robert D.
H ver, the current climate illustrates that the long-term success of litigation in this area may be 
called into question.  See Sunyoung Yang, Unprecedented Findings of Civil Rights Violations in 
Federal Audit of Los Angeles Metro, BUS RIDERS UNION (Dec. 13, 2011), 
www.thestrategycenter.org/blog/2011/12/13/unprecedented-findings-civil-rights-violations-federal-
audit-los-angeles-metro. 
 141 Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, No. CV-F-04-6121 LJO 
DLB, 2007 WL 2408495
2 . 
 142 N.Y. Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1033. 
 143
 144 Id. 
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associated with its operations—costs stemming from different 
 
made a prima facie showing that the proposed fare increases, taken 
together, would have a disparate impact upon members of protected 
minority groups.”145 
The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court had 
“focused on the proposed NYCTA fare increase without examining the 
broader financial and administrative context in which the fare increase 
was adopted.”146  A distinguishing factor in the case was that New York 
state law commanded the allocation of subsidies between NYCTA and 
commuter 
ining—that is, when faced with operating shortfalls due to the 
state’s or city’s withholding of funds from NYCTA, the agency was 
forced to respond in some manner, be it through raising fares or cutting 
services.147  Therefore, many of NYCTA’s decisions were not as 
discretionary as they appeared in the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence. 
The appellate court faulted the district court’s finding that the 
plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of disparate impact based 
“upon a comparison of the so-called ‘farebox recovery ratios’ of the 
NYCTA and the commuter lines.”148  The farebox recovery ratio 
quantifies the percentage of each system’s operating costs recovered 
through fare revenues.149  The Second Circuit did not fault the lev
ficance of the disparity established through that measure, but rather 
the use of the measure itself.150  The court held that because the essence 
of the plaintiffs’ claim was based on the total allocation of subsidies to 
the systems, the farebox recovery ratio could not “adequately capture the 
impact of these subsidies upon NYCTA and commuter line 
passengers.”151 
The court concluded that the farebox recovery ratio was not a 
sufficient basis for a finding of disparate impact, in part because it failed 
to “reveal the extent to which one system might have higher costs 
 145 Id. at 1037. 
t noted that the district court appeared to have accepted the farebox recovery 
7. 
  The district court found that the NYCTA fare increase would lead to a 
signi
 146 Id. at 1033. 
 147 Id. at 1037. 
 148 Id.  The cour
ratio as a measure of disparate impact “simply because the MTA records this statistic.”  Id. at 1038.  
The parties argued as to why MTA records farebox recovery ratios, with plaintiffs suggesting the 
statistics were kept to track the percentage of costs allocated to users of each system, while MTA 
provided that the statistics were used to measure operating efficiency rather than disparities in 
subsidization.  Id. 
 149 Id. at 103
 150 Id. at 1037-38.
“ ficant” increase in the farebox recovery ratio of the subway and bus systems at 12.6%, as 
compared to a much smaller increase in the commuter lines’ ratios—around 2%.  Id. at 1037. 
 151 Id. at 1037. 
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stem and their relative costs foreclosed any assumption 
that 
the expense of City 
Tran a
asing Regional Rail ridership to boost revenues.   
The 
 
maintenance requirements, schedules of operation, labor contracts, and 
so on.”152  Further, the fundamental differences in the operation of each 
transportation sy
each system’s expenses bore any “proportionate relationship” and 
could “obscure the level of subsidies to each,” leaving the court to 
conclude that the “farebox recovery ratio itself [was] insufficient to 
support a conclusion that the total allocation of subsidies ha[d] a 
disparate impact upon minority NYCTA riders.”153 
Another pre-Sandoval case, Committee for a Better North 
Philadelphia v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 
involved a similar claim of unequal distribution of subsidies between 
inter-city bus (City Transit) and intra-city commuter rail (Regional Rail) 
services operated by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority (SEPTA).154  Plaintiffs alleged that SEPTA used an “unfair 
portion of its subsidy dollars in Regional Rail at 
sit,” which had a higher percent ge of African-American riders than 
did Regional Rail.155  Plaintiffs argued that SEPTA’s system of “cross-
subsidization” resulted in City Transit riders paying “a higher percentage 
of that division’s operating budget,” resulting in a disparate impact to 
minority riders.156 
SEPTA conceded that City Transit had a higher percentage of 
African-American riders than Regional Rail and that City Transit fares 
would have been lower had it “allocated the subsidies available to it in 
direct proportion to the passenger fare revenues rather than in response to 
operating deficits of its individual divisions.”157  SEPTA argued, 
however, that cross-subsidization was necessary in order to balance its 
budget while incre 158
court agreed this was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 
SEPTA’s disproportionate allocation of subsidies.159  The court held that 
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to show an equally effective yet less 
discriminatory alternative because plaintiffs “oversimplifie[d] the 
 152 Id. at 1038. 
 Better N. Phila. v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., No. 88-1275, 1990 WL 121177, 
t *1 a. Aug. 14, 1990), aff’d mem., 935 F.2d 1280 (3d Cir. 1991).  While this case was 
nalyz
 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Comm. for a
a (E.D. P
a ed under the pre-Civil Rights Act of 1991 evidentiary structure, it does not affect the 
plaintiffs’ initial evidentiary burden as discussed herein.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw 
2012). 
 155 Comm. for a Better N. Phila., 1990 WL 121177, at *1. 
 156
 157 Id. at *3. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
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d “increase[d] bus fares” while eliminating discounted 
monthly
ssions between the plaintiffs and 
objectives of SEPTA” as it had the “responsibility for operating an 
integrated mass transit system throughout the five county area while 
maintaining a balanced budget,” which required “responses to the 
economic realities of a diversified transportation business.”160  The court 
characterized the “action [as] nothing more [than] an attack on the 
business judgment of SEPTA,” and granted summary judgment to 
defendants.161 
In Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles County 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority,162 a group of bus passengers 
challenged the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority’s (LACMTA’s) choice to “spend several hundred million 
dollars on a new rail line,” while neglecting “overcrowding problems on 
city buses” an
 passes.163  Plaintiffs alleged LACMTA “was spending a 
disproportionately large portion of its budget on rail lines and suburban 
bus systems that would primarily benefit white suburban commuters, 
while intentionally neglecting inner-city and transit-dependent minority 
bus riders who relied on the city bus system.”164  LACMTA’s CEO 
“openly acknowledged” the “fact that separate, unequal, and second-
class service was being provided to an inner-city bus ridership comprised 
overwhelmingly of people of color.”165 
The bus-versus-rail controversy in Los Angeles began in the 1970’s, 
peaking with the plaintiffs’ decade-long legal fight against the 
LACMTA,166 and arguably is not yet over.167  Plaintiffs’ first legal 
victory was the issuance of a six-month temporary restraining order 
halting bus fare increases intended to fund rail projects, which also 
served as an impetus to settlement discu
 
 160 Id. 
 161 at *3 n.10, *4. 
or/Cmty. Strategy Center v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. CV-94-05936 TJH 
MX  Oct. 29, 1996), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th 
ir. 2 t’s remedial order after LACMTA failed to comply with the 
., Press Release, Bus Riders Union, New Study Finds MTA Policies Squeezing 
ransit Rider nds (Feb. 24, 2011), available at 
/24/new-study-finds-mta-policies-squeezing-transit-riders-




(C C.D. Cal.) (
 163 Labor/Cmty. Strategy
C 1) (affirming district cour00
consent decree). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Mann, supra note 140, at 39. 
 166 Id. at 34, 36. 
 167 See, e.g
T s at Both E
www.thestrategycenter.org/blog/2011/02
b nds; Memorandu
A  Leahy, Chief Executive Officer, LACMTA (Apr. 23, 2012), available at 
www.fta.dot.gov/printer_friendly/12328_14553.html. 
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LACMTA.168  When those initial settlement discussions failed, plaintiffs 
filed a class action alleging that LACMTA “intentionally discriminated 
against poor minority bus riders, and that their actions had a 
discriminatory impact on poor people of color.”169  After two years of 
discovery, and shortly before the trial was set to begin, the parties 
reached a settlement through a comprehensive consent decree aimed at 
improving bus service.170  The LACMTA arguably conceded to 
plaintiffs’ demands in order “to avoid having a finding of racial 
discrimination entered against them,” given that the plaintiffs’ evidence 
included both damning statistics of disparity171 and the overtly 
discriminatory practices of the agency.172  The resulting ten-year, 
multibillion-dollar consent decree was the largest settlement in civil 
rights history.173 
2. Post-Sandoval: Only the Forum Has Changed 
Another case of interest involving a section 11135 claim that arose 
l did not change 
anything in relation to burdens of proof.  In Committee Concerning 
Com
 
post-Sandoval shows that, in practical effect, Sandova
munity Improvement v. City of Modesto, the plaintiffs brought 
federal and state-law claims based on discrimination with regard to the 
unequal distribution of municipal services.174  The plaintiffs alleged that 
  Mann, supra note 140, at 39. 
  TIM CRESSWELL, ON THE MOVE: MOBILITY IN THE MODERN WESTERN WORLD 168 
(2006).  Plaintiffs presented the following statistics: 
168
169
Al s rider e bus riders and 80% of t em are people of




171 Mann, supra note 140, at 40. 
an B. Seymore, Set the Captives Free! Transit Inequity in Urban Centers, and the Laws 
nd P parity, 16 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 57, 82 (2005).  
ACM its feet in complying with the consent decree, was found out of compliance at 
any 
tho s ar h  
color, MTA spends only 30% of its resources on buses.  A typical MTA rider is a woman of 
color, in her twenties, with a household income u
ugh almost 94% of the MTA’
lieu of public transit, according to the MTA’s own studies.  In sharp contrast, the MTA 
spends 70% of its resources on rail, which carries only 6% of its riders and serves a 
disproportionately white ridership. 
170 Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th
. 2001). 
 
 172 Id. at 39. 
 173 Se
a olicies Which Aggravate the Dis
L TA dragged 
m of the settlement milestones, and continued to fight the validity of the consent decree.  Mann, 
supra note 140, at 43.  However, the court-appointed Special Master, the district court, and the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the consent decree and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected LACMTA’s final appeal.  Id. 
 174 Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, No. CV-F-04-6121 LJO 
DLB, 2007 WL 2408495, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2007), vacated in part, 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
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rt’s decision in Darensburg.   
How
reversed and remanded in part.   The court reversed and remanded the 
district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ intentional discrimination 
 
over the preceding fifty years, the City of Modesto had grown steadily by 
annexing certain predominantly white residential developments and 
leaving predominantly Latino neighborhoods unincorporated.175  This 
left residents of unincorporated (and largely Latino) neighborhoods 
without adequate infrastructure (i.e., without sidewalks, proper sewage, 
and effective law enforcement).176  Plaintiffs alleged that Latinos living 
in these unincorporated neighborhoods were being discriminated against 
and had suffered disproportionate harm as a result of the municipality’s 
annexation and funding decisions.177 
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ § 1983 and Title VI 
claims for failure to show discriminatory intent.178  In this regard, 
Modesto paralleled the lower cou 179
ever, rather than ruling on the merits of the state-law claims, as the 
court did in Darensburg, the court in Modesto declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the section 11135 claim, dismissing the 
claim without prejudice.180  The court explained that a showing of 
“intentional discrimination is not required for proof of a section 11135 
claim, which may be proved by disparate impact,” and “while the state 
and federal claims [arose] from the same set of operative facts, the proof 
of the federal claims versus the state claims is entirely different.”181  A 
decision on the state-law claims would have thus required “statutory 
construction or interpretation,” better left to state courts, where the level 
of proof for disparate-impact claims had not yet been addressed.182  
Further, the court noted that “[a]ny decisions this [c]ourt would make on 
the state claims [would be] unnecessary because federal claims no longer 
exist[ed] in this action”183 and the claim therefore “should be resolved by 
a state court.”184 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in part and 
185
 175 Third Amended Complaint at 6, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of 
Modesto, No. CIV-F-04-6121 LJO DLB (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2007), 2007 WL 969224. 
 176 Id. at 2. 
rg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 
36 F . 2011). 
m. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 715 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 177 Id. at 2-3. 
 178 Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement, 2007 WL 2408495, at *8. 
 179 Darensbu
6 .3d 511 (9th Cir
 180 Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement, 2007 WL 2408495, at *8. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Com
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intiffs’ neighborhoods from the Master Tax Sharing 
Agre
the MTSA were seventy-one percent Latino, 
whil
statistics [did] not account for the total Latino population of the 
 
claims relating directly to annexation.186  Those claims were based on the 
exclusion of pla
ement (MTSA) between the city and county—the plaintiffs argued 
that their exclusion disincentivized infrastructure projects in their 
neighborhoods and foreclosed the possibility their neighborhoods would 
be annexed in the future.187  The Ninth Circuit held that evidence of 
“gross statistical disparities” may be used to satisfy the intent 
requirement of a Title VI claim where the evidence “tends to show that 
some invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy.”188  
Though statistical evidence of discriminatory impact alone does not 
prove intent to discriminate, it, along with supporting circumstantial 
evidence, may be “considered in determining whether there is evidence 
of intent or purpose to discriminate.”189  In reversing the district court, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the statistical evidence presented by the 
plaintiffs, along with other circumstantial factors, provided “evidence of 
discriminatory impact which . . . created a sufficient inference of 
discriminatory intent to permit [the plaintiffs] to present their MTSA 
claim to a fact-finder.”190 
In support of their MTSA claim, the plaintiffs in Modesto presented 
“statistical evidence comparing the ethnicity of the population in the . . . 
neighborhoods excluded by the MTSA to those covered by the 
MTSA.”191  These statistics showed that non-annexed neighborhoods 
that were excluded from 
e those included were forty-eight percent Latino.192  The court found 
“[t]he differences in the proportions of Latinos in the areas excluded and 
included [were] statistically significant.”193 
The district court rejected this evidence, faulting the statistical 
comparisons made by the plaintiffs as failing to provide an appropriate 
measure for assessing disparate impact.194  Concluding that “plaintiffs’ 
 186 Id. at 716. 
ict court’s holding that the MTSA claim was time-barred and that plaintiffs could use time-
idence to establish motive and to put [their] timely-filed claims in context.”  Id. 
ing Cmty. Improvement, 583 F.3d at 703. 
ncerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, No. CV-F-04-6121 LJO 
LB,  at *10-12 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2007), rev’d, 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 187 Id. at 697.  Unrelated to the quality of the evidence presented, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the distr
barred MTSAs “as ev
at 702 (citation omitted). 
 188 Id. at 703 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1997); 
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977)). 
 189 Comm. Concern
 190 Id. at 705. 
 191 Id. at 703. 
 192 Id. at 703-04. 
 193 Id. at 703. 
 194 Comm. Co
D 2007 WL 1456142,
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each of the three impacted 
coun
l non-Latino population of the included areas and found 
that 
gly, although the district court rejected “plaintiffs’ statistical 
evide
a reasonable jury would be unable to find disparate impact.’”  
 
unincorporated areas,” the court held that plaintiffs “selectively 
analyze[d] the Latino population within 
ty islands, but [did] not adequately statistically analyze the Latino 
population in relation to either the total population or total Latino 
population.”195 
The Ninth Circuit found however, that the district court’s reference 
to “the total Latino population” was unclear because the “[p]laintiffs did 
compare the total Latino population in the excluded areas to the total 
Latino population in the included areas.”196  The court noted that 
“plaintiffs compared the total non-Latino population of the excluded 
areas to the tota
. . . the MTSA included more non-Latinos than it excluded.”197  The 
court also faulted the defendants’ contention that these statistics were 
“inconsequential” because they also included white residents.198  The 
court found no “precedent for conducting this type of within-
neighborhood analysis; as the question is whether particular islands have 
been excluded because of their racial composition, the type of island-to-
island comparison conducted by plaintiffs is appropriate.”199  Therefore, 
the court held, these statistics combined with other non-statistical 
evidence should not have been dismissed at the summary judgment 
stage.200 
The Ninth Circuit also noted that the district court “did not 
conclude, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs had not shown disparate 
impact.”201  Rather, in analyzing plaintiffs’ federal claims the district 
court ruled that, even assuming the statistics showed a disparate impact, 
they “did not give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”202  
Interestin
nce in the course of analyzing the MTSA claim under equal 
protection, it did find, in the course of analyzing plaintiffs’ companion 
[section] 11135 claim, that plaintiffs had presented some evidence of 
disparate impact” and “that it could not ‘conclude as a matter of law, that 
203
 195 Id. at *10. 
 196 Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 704 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 
citing Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, No. CV-F-04-6121 
JO D  at *19 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2007)).  However, the district court ruled 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 705.
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. (
L LB, 2007 WL 1456142,
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tive law 
enfo
ne’s home for law-enforcement or emergency 
perso
ourt.  The Ninth Circuit reinstated and remanded the 
secti
 
The Ninth Circuit upheld dismissal of the claims related to sewage 
services, finding that “sewer services [were] provided to only 3 of the 26 
unincorporated islands,” including statistically non-minority 
unincorporated islands, therefore finding the statistical evidence failing 
to show a disparity and “insufficient to give rise to an inference of 
discriminatory intent.”204 
However, regarding the claims alleging lack of effec
rcement, the Ninth Circuit found that a difference in dispatch and 
response times of one to two minutes between plaintiffs’ neighborhoods 
and majority-white islands was “statistically significant.”205  The court 
would not conclude “as a matter of law” that even “a difference of one 
minute can be characterized as not making a ‘meaningful difference’ 
when one is waiting at o
nnel to arrive, particularly in the absence of any explanation for 
why the time difference exists.”206  The court remanded the issue to the 
district court to decide whether the difference was “explainable on 
grounds other than the ethnicity of the population of the 
neighborhoods.”207 
The Ninth Circuit found the district court’s dismissal of the section 
11135 claims “assuredly reasonable” and not “an abuse of discretion,” 
but noted that the dismissal was intertwined with the dismissal of the 
federal-law claims.208  Otherwise, the Ninth Circuit did not comment on 
the district court’s inference that disparate-impact claims under state law 
would be entirely different than those under federal law and thus best 
resolved by a state c
on 11135 claims in case the district court was more inclined to 
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over those claims along with the 
federal claims it remanded.209  However, the Ninth Circuit noted that if 
the district court were to dismiss the state-law claims again it would not 
necessarily be an abuse of discretion.210  That question was never 
answered by the district court, however, because shortly after the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision the parties entered into a settlement agreement that 
th e disparate-impact claim under section 11135 was time-barred.  Comm. Concerning Cmty. 
Improvement, 2007 WL 1456142, at *19.  Having concluded the claims not to be time-barred, the 




204 Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement, 583 F.3d at 707. 
 205 Id. at 709. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. a
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
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ffected population 
again
could have presented statistical evidence comparing either: (1) MTC’s 
allocation of operating subsidies between bus and rail; (2) MTC’s 
allocation of capital subsidies between bus and rail; or (3) MTC’s total 
allocation of subsidies between bus and rail.213  The third option boasts 
 
included “commitments by the city and County to support future 
annexation efforts by the plaintiff neighborhoods.”211 
Two clear patterns emerge from the above cases—the importance of 
an “appropriate measure” of disparity, and the question of whether that 
measure presents a “significantly discriminatory impact” to establish a 
prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination.  As one 
commentator observed, “The small universe of Title VI litigation appears 
to indicate that, when courts determine disparity, it is appropriate to 
measure the racial proportionality of the allegedly a
st the population of the defendant entity’s decision making 
jurisdiction.”212  Therefore, the preliminary question in building a prima 
facie case of disparate-impact discrimination is what will be measured 
and how data will be compared in the disparity analysis.  However, the 
case law presents no clear picture of what exactly that would entail. 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN DARENSBURG 
A. PLAINTIFFS’ PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DISPARATE IMPACT 
In order to evidence a measure of disparity between subsidies per 
passenger among MTC’s transit operators, plaintiffs in Darensburg 
 211 Press Release, California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., Latino Residents Reach Settlement 
atham Worsham, Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602: Can A 
with City of Modesto and Stanislaus County on Equal Access to Municipal Services (June 30, 2011), 
available at www.crla.org/sites/all/files/content/uploads/pressreleases/2011/063011_Modesto 
PressRelease.pdf. 
 212 Julia B. L
Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 631, 689 (2000) (citing 
Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 1996) (comparing the percentage of Hispanic 
students enrolled at one school with the percentage of Hispanic students in the entire school district); 
Larry P. by Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 983 (9th Cir. 1984) (comparing the percentage of 
African-American students in the state school system’s “educable mentally retarded” population 
with the percentage of African-American students in the entire state school population)); see also 
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (1997) (comparing 
racial composition of population affected by challenged permit and racial composition of the rest of 
the county); Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The basis for 
a successful disparate impact claim involves a comparison between two groups-those affected and 
those unaffected by the facially neutral policy.”).  But see Coal. of Concerned Citizens Against I-670 
v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (focusing solely on the racial composition of the 
neighborhoods through which the proposed highway would traverse). 
 213 Siegel, supra note 5, at 119. 
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eless failed to 
convince the Ninth Circuit that MTC’s allocation of funding to expand 
rail services resulted in a disparate impact to minority bus riders.215 
1.  The District Court’s Oversimplication of the Facts 
In 2001, MTC adopted the Regional Transit Expansion Plan 
 that MTC’s 
selection criteria for projects funded under Resolution 3434 caused a 
dispa
esolution 3434 project costs were for rail 
proje
support from the cases discussed above,214 but neverth
Although the Darensburg district court observed that “comparing 
transit service is more an art than a science,”216 it found that plaintiffs’ 
statistics established a prima facie case under section 11135 in relation to 
the discretionary funds allocated by MTC under Resolution 3434, its 
strategic long-range plan for transit expansion projects,217 but not in 
relation to committed funds that were dedicated to certain uses according 
to the mandates of the sources of those funds, leaving MTC little 
discretion in their allocation.218 
(RTEP), known as Resolution 3434.219  Plaintiffs alleged
rate impact.220  The district court agreed, finding that “the evidence 
showed that MTC applied different criteria to bus projects than to rail 
projects.”221  This finding did not require an intensive statistical showing, 
as testimony revealed that “AC Transit was required to show that its 
proposed bus projects would lure travelers out of their single occupancy 
vehicles, whereas rail projects . . . were simply assumed to do so.”222  
However, the statistical evidence bolstered plaintiffs’ claim.  
“[A]pproximately 94% of the R
cts, and less than 5% were for bus projects,” and “84.4% of 
Resolution 3434 funds were dedicated to lower minority operators, 
 
 214 See, e.g., N.Y. Urban League v. N.Y., 71 F.3d 1031, 1037 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) 
(holding that because the underlying claim challenged the total allocation of subsidies, the district 
ourt  measure or combination of measures could adequately 
aptur
 Cir. 2011). 
c should have “assessed whether any
c e the impact of these subsidies upon NYCTA and commuter line passengers”); Labor/Cmty. 
Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. CV-94-05936 TJH (CMX) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 
1996), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2001) (plaintiffs allegations that total allocations of funds were 
discriminatory resulted in a powerful settlement); Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of 
Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 704 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a narrow analysis of patterns within specific 
neighborhoods). 
 215 Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 216 Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 
636 F.3d 511 (9th
 217 Id. at 1044. 
 218 Id. at 1050. 
 219 Id. at 1043. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
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cies” presented an oversimplified picture of MTC’s 
fund
modes to “the proverbial apples and oranges 
issue
and . . . higher minority operators received only 8%.”223  Therefore, 
“MTC’s selection process . . . cause[d] a disparity in funding for rail 
projects that on the whole are used by a lower percentage of minority 
riders, as opposed to bus projects.”224  The court held, “[o]n balance,” in 
regard to Resolution 3434, that plaintiffs had shown a prima facie case of 
disparate impact.225 
In regard to committed funds administered by the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA), the State of California, and regional funding 
measures approved by local voters, plaintiffs alleged that MTC 
effectively diverted funds from the operational costs of AC Transit to 
costly rail expansion projects, “in effect starving the existing bus system 
to feed the growth of capital-hungry rail,” producing a disparate impact 
on high-minority-percentage operators such as AC Transit.226  However, 
the district court held that a statistical comparison “from the viewpoint of 
absolute numbers of minority riders advantaged or disadvantaged by 
MTC’s funding poli
ing practices.227 
First, MTC’s role in the allocation of committed funds was 
restricted by conditions placed on the receipt of those funds, with MTC’s 
role in allocation largely limited to ensuring the funds went only to 
projects conforming to the Regional Transportation Plan.228  Second, 
while AC Transit’s budget shortfalls were lower than any other MTC 
operator, AC Transit started at a disadvantage, both because its declining 
ridership produced less revenue and because it received less support from 
dedicated state and local funds than did other operators, apart from any 
action by MTC.229  Third, the court likened any comparison between 
different operating 
.”230  Fourth, the court explained that “[d]efining the appropriate 
 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 1044. 
 225 Id.  However, under the burden-shifting framework of the disparate-impact analysis, the 
t held t TC had satisfied its burden in justifying its practice and that plaintiffs failed to offer 
n equ ective alternative.  Id. at 1051-61.  This portion of the holding is not discussed here, as 
e Ni cuit did not reach that portion of the analysis because it found the district court’s 
ndin rima facie case “clearly erroneous.”  Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 
11, 5 Cir. 2011). 
 611 F. Supp. at 1044-45. 
 long-haul operations, eligibility for funding by geographical location, 
hrough sales tax ballot measures, and the fact that 




fi g of a p
5 22 (9th 
 226 Darensburg,
 227 Id. at 1048. 
 228 Id. at 1045. 
 229 Id. at 1046. 
 230 Id. at 1047.  The court noted several factors: some operators are single-mode (i.e., only 
bus) while some operate several modes (i.e., bus, historic trolleys, light rail and cable cars), 
differences in short- and
operators’ ability to generate their own revenue t
b stems have lowe
30
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ysis should apply where statistical studies show a disparate 
impa
raises an inference of intentional discrimination, then how does it differ 
from an intentional discrimination case built on statistics?”237  If 
statistics in a disparate-impact case must paint the same picture as 
required in intentional discrimination cases, “then the disparate impact 
comparison groups to assess disparate impact is further complicated by 
the Bay Area’s ‘majority minority’ population of transit users.”231  Sixty-
one percent of all riders were minorities; therefore a comparison between 
the fifty-one percent minority ridership of rail operators and the sixty-six 
percent minority ridership of bus operators did not reflect a disparity, 
given that MTC’s Title VI reporting benchmark for analyzing disparate 
impact was set at seventy percent.232  Consideration of all of these 
factors led the court to conclude that while “MTC could take at least 
some additional steps to allocate committed funds in a way that would 
somewhat alleviate AC Transit’s shortfalls, . . . on balance, [p]laintiffs 
[had] not met their burden of showing that MTC’s funding practices 
regarding committed funds [had] a significantly disproportionate 
impact.”233 
In many ways, this portion of the district court’s opinion illustrates a 
question similar to the one arising out of Committee for a Better North 
Philadelphia.  In 1988, the Supreme Court described the disparate-
impact analysis as “functionally equivalent” to that in cases of intentional 
discrimination.234  This explains why the first two stages of the burden-
shifting framework under disparate-impact analysis do not require proof 
of intentional discrimination, but it does not “answer whether disparate-
impact anal
ct on minorities but the statistical studies do not, for various 
reasons, give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”235 
This question also creates problems in cases, such as Darensburg, 
where the plaintiffs’ claims involve both intentional and disparate-impact 
discrimination theories.  For example, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the “[p]laintiffs’ failure to establish that MTC’s conduct ha[d] a 
discriminatory impact prevents any inference of intentional 
discrimination.”236  But “[i]f the prima facie case of a disparate impact 
 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. at 1051.  The district court similarly dismissed plaintiffs’ claims related to the 
allocation of uncommitted funds.  Id. 
 234 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988). 
ms, supra note 105, at 426 (arguing that the “pretext model” would “solve the 
oble
. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 235 Ada
pr m”). 
 236 Darensburg v. Metro. Transp
 237 Adams, supra note 105, at 432. 
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The court noted that the district court’s finding of a “disparity in 
d by a lower percentage 
of minority riders as opposed to bus projects” was based on the statistical 
comp
analysis loses both independent theoretical meaning and practical 
import.”238 
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Return to Obscurity 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that “[t]he district 
court’s inference that minorities were adversely affected by the RTEP 
[was] based on an inappropriate statistical measure and a logical fallacy, 
and [was] therefore clearly erroneous.”239  The court found that 
plaintiffs’ statistical evidence was not an ‘appropriate measure’ for 
presenting what, if any, adverse impact the RTEP would have on 
minority riders, and therefore they had not “carried their burden to 
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination.”240
funding for rail projects that on the whole are use
arison between the sixty-six percent minority ridership of bus 
operators and the fifty-one percent minority ridership of rail operators.241  
It also noted that “[t]he district court never expressly found that MTC’s 
funding of rail over bus adversely affected San Francisco Bay Area 
minorities,” but that the court “must have drawn that inference” in order 
to find that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case.242  The Ninth 
Circuit found this inference to be based  
[O]n a faulty syllogism: (1) a greater percentage of bus riders than rail 
riders are minorities; (2) fewer bus expansion projects than rail 
expansion projects were included in the RTEP, and bus projects 
 
  Id. at 433. 
 
238
hat finding is 
logic ord.” (footnote 
mitted
rt then explained that because the defendant’s rebuttal burden was “a state law 
of by refusing to consider the other evidence considered by the district court in its 
eterm
cs the Ninth Circuit references here 
lated
239 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 522 (citing United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[W]e will affirm a district court’s factual finding unless t
il  implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the recal,
o ))). 
 240 Id.  The cou
issue of first impression” and because plaintiffs had failed to present a prima facie case, it need not 
weigh in on any other aspects of the section 11135 claims.  Id. 
 241 Id. at 519.  Perhaps, though, the court was guilty of the same oversimplification it accused 
the plaintiffs 
d ination.  For example, the district court’s opinion indicates that the statistics it used, in 
addition to the testimonial evidence, were related to the percentage of Resolution 3434 funds 
allocated among the various operators rather than the statisti
re  to the overall minority ridership of bus versus rail operators considered by the district court 
when analyzing the allocation of committed funds.  See Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 
F. Supp. 2d 994, 1044-48 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 242 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 519. 
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cts. 4  Thus, in the 





thos dict how the 
expansion pr
analysis was based on the lack of equal standards for the allocation of 
 
received a lesser percentage of requested funding than did rail 
projects; (3) therefore, minorities were adversely affected.243 
Reliance on overall ridership statistics therefore failed to take into 
account the particular ridership of the future rail proje 24
ting disparities that may be present in the current system, wh
ntiffs’ claims actually related to future expansion projects position
funding in the RTEP.245  Therefore, the court was looking 
ence showing that minority riders would be adversely impacted 
e future projects.246  The court found it impossible to pre
ojects would affect future ridership without more precise 
data reflecting the ridership of the planned rail expansions.247  Hence, 
“[the] court simply could not determine from Plaintiffs’ statistical 
evidence whether the projects in the RTEP will benefit or harm the Bay 
Area’s minority transit riders.”248 
However, this raises important questions about how future ridership 
can be estimated and what the appropriate comparison population would 
be.  If one were to project future ridership statistics based on current 
trends, it is arguable that rail expansion would magnify any current 
disparities.  The district court poignantly noted that “as capital-intensive 
rail operators such as BART increase their fleets of rail cars, there will be 
even more demand on Resolution 3434 funds for rail expansion likely at 
the expense of bus services.”249  In sharp contrast, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that under the theory rep sented by the plaintiffs, where “the 
population of bus riders contains a greater percentage of minorities than 
the population of rail riders, any RTEP that emphasizes rail expansion 
over bus expansion, even where such a plan may confer a far greater 
benefit upon minorities than whites, would be subject to legal 
challenge.”250  This comparison highlights the differences in the courts’ 
analyses—the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was focused on comparisons of 
minority ridership among the operators,251 while the district court’s 
 243 Id. at 520. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. at 521. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
ntern on omitted), aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011). 




 251 Id. a
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red minorities in that regard.  
Resolution 3434 funds and the resulting disparity among the allocation to 
bus versus rail operators.252 
As further support for its holding that the plaintiffs failed to provide 
an appropriate statistical measure, the Ninth Circuit pointed to the fact 
that $9 billion of the $13.5 billion RTEP funds allocated to rail 
expansion projects were sponsored, at least in part, by operators with a 
majority-minority ridership.253  The court suggested that if it were the 
plaintiffs’ belief that these operators were making sponsoring decisions 
to the detriment of their minority ridership, their complaint would be 
better aimed specifically at those operators rather than MTC.254 
The Ninth Circuit “simply could not determine” from existing 
ridership stat
 the Bay Area’s minority transit riders,”255 leaving the question of 
what comparison population would present an “appropriate measure” 
unanswered.  In a 2011 presentation at the annual California Transit 
Association conference, one of the attorneys who had represented MTC 
in Darensburg expressed gratitude that he did not have to answer that 
hard question.256 
Noting there are few cases factually similar to those presented in 
Darensburg, the court cited Bean v. Southwestern Waste Man
. as illustrative of the “importance of providing an appropriately 
precise statistical measure of disparate impact.”257  In challenging the 
siting of a waste management facility in their neighborhood as 
discriminatory, plaintiffs in Bean presented statistical evidence showing 
a concentration of waste sites in a predominantly minority quadrant of 
the city.258  However, more precise census data showed that non-
minorities lived closer to the new site, suggesting that the location may 
have actually favo 259
 
 252 Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1043-44. 
 253 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 521 n.3. 
n at the California Transit Association’s Annual Fall 
onfer sition, Surviving Title VI Litigation: (Is This What Survival Feels Like?) 
ission (Nov. 4, 2011) (PowerPoint presentation 
/files/resources/FISCAL%20Title%20VI-Manolius.ppt) 
Tha Court did not ask me for my thoughts on what an appropriate comparison might 
e.”). 
e collected, and they are not consistent throughout the country. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. at 521. 
 256 Kimon Manolius, Presentatio
C ce & Expoen
Darensburg v. Metropolitan Transportation Comm
available at www.caltransit.org
(“ nkfully, the 
b
 257 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 521 (citing Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 
(S.D. Texas 1979)). 
 258 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679. 
 259 Id. at 678-69.  However, future litigants must be wary of relying on census data, which are 
notoriously unreliable, to illustrate any particular data set as there are very few guidelines for how 
they ar
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d and existing transit 
servi
ay serve to benefit minorities.   
Whil
The Darensburg court therefore found Bean “directly applicable to 
[p]laintiffs’ prima facie case” because “[i]f the court had more precise 
data that would allow it to evaluate each project’s impact on transit 
ridership, it could very well find that the proposed expansion plan 
actually favors minorities, or harms minorities to a greater extent than 
regional-level statistics may suggest.”260  Herein lies the problem for 
plaintiffs in Darensburg.  This showing would require a glimpse into the 
future to predict the ridership of both planne
ces when the new services are completed.  Assessing population 
statistics near future transit projects could presumably make that 
showing, but that evidence would largely ignore the plaintiffs’ 
underlying claim—that future rail projects were funded to the obvious 
detriment of the bus service they relied on and that MTC’s long-range 
plan would aggravate that disparity. 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Bean announced the 
court’s message in Darensburg to disparate impact claimants: to make a 
prima facie case, plaintiffs must provide statistical evidence showing 
impacts to the specific persons affected on a project level.  This lesson, 
however, is particularly problematic for plaintiffs such as those in 
Darensburg.  The court pointed out that, in absolute numbers, BART 
actually serves two million more minority riders than does AC transit, 
implying that future rail projects m 261
e minority riders do make up a greater percentage of bus riders, a 
rail expansion project into areas that are predominantly minority would 
in fact benefit those riders.262  The court pointed to the example of the 
MUNI central subway project that, when completed, will connect two of 
San Francisco’s highest minority populated neighborhoods, Bayview and 
Chinatown.263  This point, however, still ignores the fact that AC Transit 
riders faced reductions in service while there were no plans to expand 
rail into plaintiffs’ neighborhoods. 
 
 260 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 522. 
261  Id. at 521. 
 262 Id. 
ese strictly through the eyes of race in the future may disguise 
eriou
sets forth steps to prevent 
cts to minority or low-income populations through Title VI 
nalys ental justice analyses conducted as part of Federal transportation planning and 
EPA ons.”). 
 263 Id.  In large metropolitan regions with a majority-minority population, such as the Bay 
Area and the Los Angeles Basin, it is possible that no set of data would present a clear picture of 
isparityd .  Looking at cases such as th
s verse effects of decisions, as ad s the country’s population grows increasingly diverse.  While 
not a protected class under federal law, low-income populations may serve as a better guide to 
measure disparity under agency regulations.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. Updated Envtl. Justice Order 
5610.2(a), 77 Fed. Reg. 27,534 (May 10, 2012) (“The Order 
disproportionately high and adverse effe
a es and environm
N  provisi
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ly decline, likely to the detriment of 
inner
ffs’ attorneys) filed an administrative 
comp
service and fare equity analysis and therefore failed to evaluate whether 
the project would have a disproportionate impact on minority and low-
income populations.270  In response to the complaint, FTA conducted a 
itle
In absolute terms, looking at the ridership trends between bus and 
rail in the recent past would likely present the picture painted by the 
district court—if future funding continues to be dominated by rail 
projects, bus service will continual
-city minorities who are effectively denied access to rail.264  
However, as the Ninth Circuit suggested,265 delving into the facts at the 
project level for at least one of the projects funded by Resolution 3434 
does not paint a prettier picture. 
Resolution 3434 included $350 million earmarked for the 
BART/Oakland Airport Connection (OAC) rail expansion project.266  
Concurrent with litigation in Darensburg, three parties (represented by 
two of the Darensburg plainti
laint with FTA, alleging noncompliance with Title VI when BART 
sought funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) for the OAC project.267  The facts arising out of the resulting 
investigation make two important points: first, administrative complaints 
filed under Title VI section 602 agency regulations may be a viable 
alternative to disparate-impact litigation and, second, even if plaintiffs in 
Darensburg had presented the type of statistical evidence the Ninth 
Circuit sought, their claim would have been unsuccessful against MTC.  
This example suggests, however, that if plaintiffs must present evidence 
on a project-level basis, plaintiffs’ complaint should have been against 
individual operators, as the Ninth Circuit suggested,268 as the Title VI 
violations here were attributable to BART, not MTC.269 
The complaint alleged that BART failed to comply with Title VI in 
connection with the OAC project by failing to prepare the required 
T  VI compliance review that revealed BART’s admitted 
 
 264 Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 
636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 265 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 522. 
 266 Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1016. 
 267 Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 12898, 
Urban Habitat Program v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (Before U.S. Dep’t of Transp. & FTA Sept. 
, 200
.3. 
rator, Federal Transit Administration, to Steve 
emin
plaint, supra note 267, at 20. 
1 9), available at issuu.com/transform/docs/fta_title_vi_complaint_09-1-09_final [hereinafter 
OAC Title VI Complaint]. 
 268 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 521 n
 269 Letter from Peter Rogoff, Administ
H ger, Executive Director, Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and Dorothy Dugger, 
General Manager, Bay Area Rapid Transit 1 (Jan. 15, 2010), available at 
www.bart.gov/docs/BART_MTC_Letter_On_OAC.pdf. 
 270 OAC Title VI Com
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e, MTA rejected 
the 
the OAC project, followed a few months later by the 
resig
 
noncompliance.271  While BART hastily conducted and submitted an 
equity analysis to try to bring the project into complianc
analysis as still “fail[ing] to analyze whether the [p]roject’s 
improvement and the service reductions would have a discriminatory 
impact.”272  BART’s subsequent “corrective action plan” was similarly 
rejected because “there [was] no way the agency [could] come into full 
compliance with Title VI” by the ARRA fund disbursement deadline 
later that year.273  The $70 million in ARRA funds programmed for the 
project were then redistributed among other Bay Area operators, 
including AC Transit, to fill operating shortfalls and maintain existing 
service.274 
Just months later, amidst significant public controversy, BART held 
a groundbreaking ceremony for the OAC project “after it was able, with 
much help and backroom dealing by [MTC], to secure alternative 
funding to replace the $70 million it lost [in] stimulus funds,”275 
including $25 million in federal dollars granted under a different 
program administered by the FTA.276  Around the same time, local 
voters removed from office the BART director who had been the primary 
backer of 
nation of the General Manager after significant pressure by the 
BART Board of Directors.277  Soon thereafter, FTA’s Office of Civil 
Rights opened an investigation into MTC’s civil rights practices278 and 
ultimately found deficiencies in five of fourteen Title VI compliance 
areas reviewed.279  While the administrative complaint did not in effect 
halt construction of the challenged project, it did call attention to 
 271 Letter from Peter Rogoff to Steve Heminger and Dorothy Dugger, supra note 269, at 1. 
.pdf. 
. ADVOCATES, www.publicadvocates 
rg/b
Federal Review of Fairness Practices 
ug. 
. TRANSIT ADMIN. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE VI REVIEW OF THE METRO. 
RANS
doc. 
 272 Id. at 2. 
 273 Letter from Peter Rogoff, Administrator, Federal Transit Administration, to Steve 
Heminger, Executive Director, Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and Dorothy Dugger, 
General Manager, Bay Area Rapid Transit 1-2 (Feb. 12, 2010), available at 
transbay.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/fta_oac_02122010
 274 Bart/Oakland Airport Connector (OAC), PUB
.o artoakland-airport-connector-oac (last visited Dec. 21, 2012). 
 275 Id. 
 276 Oakland Airport Connector News, BART, www.bart.gov/about/projects/oac/news.aspx 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2012). 
 277 Bart/Oakland Airport Connector (OAC), supra note 274. 
 278 Press Release, Pub. Advocates, MTC Failures Spark 
(A 17, 2010), available at www.publicadvocates.org/sites/default/files/press_releases/phase2 
pressrelease081710.pdf. 
 279 FED
T P. COMM’N FINAL REPORT 16 (Apr. 2012), available at www.fta.dot.gov/documents/MTC_ 
compliance_review_4_9_12.
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claims 
required a showing that MTC’s funding decisions were not just 
purposeful 
esent 
evidence based upon which any reasonable fact-finder could conclude 
that 
s an inference of discriminatory 
purp
disparities alone are rarely dispositive.  Therefore, disparate impact is 
only one of several factors considered, and should supplement other 
BART’s noncompliance with the mandates of Title VI and brought about 
changes both in administration and management of the agency.280 
B. PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO PROVE DISPARATE IMPACT 
PRECLUDED A FINDING OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
The Darensburg plaintiffs’ federal claims required proof of 
intentional discrimination—success on the merits of those 
objectionable, but rather were attributable to 
discrimination.281  To make such a showing, plaintiffs needed to “pr
MTC acted at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its 
adverse effects” on the plaintiff class.282 
In cases such as Darensburg, where the challenged conduct is the 
result of facially neutral policies, direct evidence of discriminatory 
purpose makes the “evidentiary inquiry relatively easy,” but such 
evidence is rare.283  Therefore, proof of disparate impact, such as 
evidence showing statistical disparities, may be used to satisfy the intent 
requirement when that evidence provide
ose.284  However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “statistics 
are not irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind 
of evidence, they may be rebutted”; therefore, “their usefulness depends 
on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.”285  Statistical 
 
 280 Similarly, while plaintiffs in Darensburg were unsuccessful in litigation, perhaps the case 
achieved a measure of success by bringing attention to MTC’s lack of compliance with Title VI.  See 
en
 have been brought about by the lawsuit). 
ed that the challenged 
acti st Chinese individuals to their total exclusion from the 
ermi
 cannot be 
Dar sburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999-1000 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 636 
F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011) (pointing out that the court’s conclusion was supported in part by a recent 
change in MTC’s policies that may
 281 See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 282 Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pers. 
Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 283 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).  The oft-
cited example is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, in which the statistical disparity show
pr ce involved enforcement only again
p tting scheme of the ordinance at question.  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) 
(“The fact of this discrimination is admitted.  No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion
resisted that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners 
belong, and which, in the eye of the law, is not justified.”).  In Arlington Heights, Justice Powell, 
writing for the Court, was careful to distinguish Yick Wo as a rarity, stating that absent such a “stark” 
disparity, impact alone is not determinative of whether purposeful discrimination exists.  Vill. of 
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
 284 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977). 
 285 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). 
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e to an inference of discriminatory intent in 
addit
an  the decisionmaker strongly favor a 
 as 
to p of 
the ry 
judg rt 
foun  a 
triable issue of fact under Arlington Heights because “[t]he 
circumstances include[d] too many strong contradictions of 
discriminatory motive that preclude drawing any reasonable inference of 
circumstantial evidence, which, when considered together, may show 
discriminatory intent.286 
The plaintiffs in Darensburg conceded that they had no direct 
evidence of any discriminatory purpose on the part of MTC, and they 
therefore relied on circumstantial evidence to argue their intentional 
discrimination claims.287  In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., the Supreme Court articulated a non-
exhaustive list of factors that may be illustrative for courts considering 
whether the “totality of the circumstances shown by [p]laintiffs’ indirect 
evidence” may give ris
ion to disparate impact:288 
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source, 
particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious 
purposes.  The specific sequence of events leading up the challenged 
decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker’s 
purposes. . . .  Departures from the normal procedural sequence also 
might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.  
Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the factors 
usually considered import t by
decision contrary to the one reached. . . .  The legislative or 
administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there 
are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, 
minutes of its meetings, or reports.289 
Despite having already concluded there were triable issues of fact
laintiffs’ disparate-impact claim—therefore meeting at least one 
factors—the district court granted MTC’s motion for summa
ment as to the claims of intentional discrimination.290  The cou
d that the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence had failed to raise
 
 286 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that disparate impact alone is 
es); Vill. of Arlington 
, at *24 
.D. ill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252). 
insufficient to evidence discriminatory intent absent exceptional circumstanc
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68 (establishing five factors as probative of intentional discrimination: (1) 
disparate impact, (2) historical background, (3) history of decisionmaking process, (4) departures 
from normal substantive factors or procedures, and (5) legislative or administrative history). 
 287 Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 523. 
 288 Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, No. C-05-01597 EDL, 2008 WL 3915349
(N Cal. Aug. 21, 2008) (referencing V
 289 Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. 
 290 Darensburg, 2008 WL 3915349, at *24-26. 
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disc ive 
anal ided a poignant example of the 
court’s inability to infer discriminatory intent by noting MTC’s 
“trea
 
riminatory intent.”291  While it did not delve into an extens
ysis of the factors, the court prov
tment of the whitest of the seven major carriers, Golden Gate 
Transit, almost two-thirds of whose passengers are white in a transit area 
that is majority minority.”292  Like AC Transit, Golden Gate Transit 
faced “steep operating shortfalls.”293  The court noted that in 2005, while 
both transit agencies lacked the funding to cover both operating and 
capital rehabilitation shortfalls, MTC provided $13.7 million in 
preventative maintenance funds to AC Transit, yet did not cover any of 
Golden Gate Transit’s shortfalls, forcing the agency to cut its service by 
thirty-five percent and lose twenty-one percent of its ridership, 
exacerbating the funding problem.294  This fact, even in isolation, “would 
strain credulity to infer that [MTC] is motivated by racial discrimination 
to harm AC Transit’s minority riders by not covering operating 
shortfalls, yet allows Golden Gate Transit’s largely white riders to suffer 
steep cuts in service instead of covering its operating shortfalls.”295 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed but placed significant weight on its 
conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed “to establish that MTC’s 
challenged conduct ha[d] a discriminatory impact,” thus preventing “any 
inferences of intentional discrimination.”296  The court explained that the 
“[p]laintiffs’ intentional discrimination claim relie[d] on drawing 
equivalences between (1) bus riders and minorities, and (2) rail-riders 
and whites, that [were] not borne out by the data.”297  While the court’s 
simplistic view here may be valid in this instance, it surely did not mean 
to suggest that because plaintiffs failed to provide the correct measure of 
disparate impact they are precluded from a balancing of the remaining 
Arlington Heights factors. 
Clearly, disparate impact alone is not enough to find constitutional 
violations in agency action; it is “not irrelevant, but it is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination,”298 and only a starting 
point in the analysis.299  “Though relevant,” since Arlington Heights, 
“[e]ven stark racial disparities are likely to be dismissed by courts,” as 
“disparate . . . impacts lack the gravity required to offset the high 
 291 Id. at *25. 
nsburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
977). 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. 
 296 Dare
 297 Id. 
 298 Washington v.
 299 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1
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alities engaging in intentional discrimination 
throu
d in a case involving 
multiple transit operators providing an array of dissimilar services makes 
lt, if not impossible, for plaintiffs. 
The evidentiary problems associated with institutional 
discr
 
evidentiary burden required to prove intent by quasi-legislative bodies 
and administrative . . . agencies.”300  This suggests that a weighing of the 
remaining Arlington Heights factors is crucial to the analysis.  For 
example, a string of Equal Protection cases represents situations in which 
courts have found municip
gh historic patterns of the discriminatory distribution of municipal 
services, even in the absence of direct evidence.301 
CONCLUSION 
In many ways, the Darensburg decision was unremarkable.  Like 
the Second Circuit in New York Urban League, the Ninth Circuit faulted 
plaintiffs for presenting an oversimplified picture of the complexity of 
the allocation of subsidies among various transit operators.302  In both of 
these cases, the plaintiffs failed to “employ an appropriate measure for 
assessing disparate impact.”303  It still remains to be determined, 
however, how a plaintiff may adequately capture a picture of disparity if 
it truly exists.  The complexity of the facts presente
this task difficu
imination claims illustrate the problems faced by many 
environmental justice plaintiffs.  Jurisprudence in this area is focused on 
the motivation of a single entity, often in the context of a single decision, 
to assess whether there is a constitutional violation, in essence 
legitimizing disparate effects by making the disparate-impact analysis a 
 300 Carlton Waterhouse, Abandon All Hope Ye That Enter? Equal Protection, Title VI, and the 
see also 
ean 
h Cir. 1983); Neighborhood Action Coal. v. City of Canton, Ohio, 882 F.2d 1012 (6th 
ir. 1
1). 
Divine Comedy of Environmental Justice, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 92 (2009); 
B v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that plaintiffs 
failed to prove discriminatory intent, despite showing disparate impact of hazardous waste facility 
siting); E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb Cnty. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 
706 F. Supp. 880, 886 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs failed to provide evidence to support 
a determination that race was a motivating factor, despite strong evidence of disparate impact); 
R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that plaintiffs lacked the 
evidence necessary to show discriminatory intent, despite the existence of a disparate impact on 
minorities). 
 301 Waterhouse, supra note 300, at 92 (citing Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 
1181-82 (11t
C 989); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Ammons v. Dade City, 
Fla., 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986); Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Midwest 
Cmty. Council, Inc. v. Chi. Park Dist., 98 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. Ill. 1983)). 
 302 See N.Y. Urban League v. N.Y., 71 F.3d 1031, 1037 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam); 
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 201
 303 N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing N.Y. 
Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1038). 
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sis.  The problem for 
envir
less-than-significant part of the equal protection analysis and tasking 
plaintiffs with the seemingly impossible undertaking of exposing 
impermissible motives.304  Indicative of this point is the fact that in the 
thirty years since the adoption of the Arlington Heights test, the Court 
has rarely found discrimination under that analy
onmental justice claimants, including the Darensburg plaintiffs, is 
that their focus lies in the outcome of multiple government decisions that 
create a disproportionate burden on these protected groups.305  While 
courts may be sympathetic to the plight of environmental justice 
plaintiffs, only in the most egregious cases is impermissible government 
action found.306 
It is well-established that state courts are the ultimate authority on 
state law, even where provisions of state law parallel provisions of 
federal law.307  Accordingly, California courts are not bound by federal 
precedent construing parallel federal text308 and, in the area of civil 
liberties, are free to provide greater protection under California law than 
that afforded by the United States Supreme Court under parallel 
provisions under federal law.309  Therefore, a state court construing 
section 11135 could, in the future, veer away from the analysis presented 
here and provide greater protection from disparate-impacts arising out of 
government action. 
 
 304 See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68 (citations omitted).  The district court in 
Darensburg also referenced another factor from an age-discrimination case providing that “[p]roof 
that the defenda ’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial nt
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.”  Darensburg 
v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, No. C-05-01597 EDL, 2008 WL 3915349, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 
 
Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-79 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
ven though a state 
e state 
eme Court has clearly recognized that 
2008) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)). 
 305 E.g., Bean v. Sw. Waste 
 306 See id. at 679; Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999-1000 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (“The [c]ourt was left with no doubt that AC Transit’s bus riders would benefit 
from additional service and that many of them are burdened by fare hikes and service cuts, 
hampering their efforts to get to work, medical appointments, and grocery shopping and to meet 
other important needs.”), aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 307 Cf. Jankovich v. Ind. Toll Rd. Comm’n, 379 U.S. 487, 491 (1965) (“[E]
court’s opinion relies on similar provisions in both the State and Federal Constitutions, th
constitutional provision has been held to provide an independent and adequate ground of decision 
depriving this Court of jurisdiction to review the state judgment.”); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 
58, 62 (1967) (“Our holding, of course, does not affect the State’s power to impose higher standards 
on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so.”); People v. 
Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112-13 (Cal. 1975) (“[T]he Supr
state courts are the ultimate arbiters of state law, even textually parallel provisions of state 
constitutions, unless such interpretations purport to restrict the liberties guaranteed the entire 
citizenry under the federal charter. . . .  [T]he California Constitution is, and always has been, a 
document of independent force.  Any other result would contradict not only the most fundamental 
principles of federalism but also the historic bases of state charters.”). 
 308 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997). 
 309 Alpha Standard Inv. Co. v. Cnty. of L.A., 173 Cal. Rptr. 328, 332 (Ct. App. 1981). 
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 disparate-impact discrimination by government-
fund
California has a long history of providing its citizens with broader 
civil rights protections than those available under federal law.310  Statutes 
like section 11135 are designed to preserve the ability to challenge 
institutional disparities and to require public agencies to engage in 
thoughtful consideration of their actions.  In recent years, while the 
federal courts have narrowed the ability of plaintiffs to present 
challenges alleging
ed programs,311 the California Legislature has provided section 
11135 as a powerful tool to address these disparities in California.312  
How powerful that avenue may be, however, will depend on future 
litigation in California courts.  For now, absent smoking-gun evidence of 
discriminatory motive, it appears plaintiffs must re-think their litigation 
strategy in complex cases such as Darensburg. 
 
 
 310 E.g., Cal. Dairies, Inc. v. RSUI Indem. Co., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1039 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 
(“California labor statutes strive to protect the minimum wage rights of California employees to a 
greater extent than federal law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mardi Gras of San Luis Obispo 
v. City of San Luis Obispo, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1025 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“The California 
Constitution, and California cases construing it, accords greater protection to the expression of free 
speech than does the United States Constitution.”); Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (striking 
down California’s anti-miscegenation statute twenty years before the United States Supreme Court 
held that anti-miscegenation statutes violate the U.S. Constitution). 
 311 Waterhouse, supra note 300, at 62-64 (noting the “federal courts’ all but unanimous 
rejection of environmental justice claims under both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI” due to 
the requirement that plaintiffs prove a type of “‘racial animus’ typically associated with the actions 
of Bull Connor and other white segregationists”). 
 312 See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
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